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DCI/IC 74-1096

Mr. Fisher Howe
Deputy Executive Director
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M. Atrect, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Fisher:

This is in reference to your letter of August 15, 1974, to of my Staff outlining the information needed by Mr. Phil Oldenburg for his research study. We have already taken steps to get a clearance for Mr. Oldenburg based on the ground rules you and I discussed on Thursday, i.e., he will be granted a SECRET clearance on a "need-to-know" basis with the explicit understanding that the use of such information will not include the citation of materials or individuals. Moreover, it will not be necessary for him to have access to the actual documents or estimates to which he refers, but he will instead be briefed from those documents as appropriate. I understand these rules will apply not only to Mr. Oldenburg but to other researchers under Mr. Bacchus' direction who may seek interviews with members of the Intelligence Community, always provided that they receive approval from the Office of Security.

Turning to the issues which Mr. Oldenburg has suggested for discussion: Questions 3, 4, and 5 can be handled by officers in our Directorate for Intelligence. They will be pleased to talk with Mr. Oldenburg on Thursday, August 22, 1974, at 2:00 p.m. Question 2 seems more appropriately to fall under the purview of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The first question is also largely beyond the purview of the Intelligence Community, but I would refer you to the testimony of

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the Director of Central Intelligence before the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the Senate Committee on Armed Services which appeared on pages S 14092 - S 14095 of the Congressional Record of 1 August 1974.

I certainly enjoyed our lunch last week, and will be looking forward to working closely with you and members of the Commission Staff as you continue your studies and research.

Sincerely,

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	Associate Deputy to the DCI	
	for the Intelligence Community	
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## Approved For Research se 2004/02/23 : CIA-RDP80M01133A 9000160056-2

## COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

2025 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 August 15, 1974

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Intelligence Community Staff Washington, D. C.

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Dear	

As you requested in your conversation with Bill Bacchus of our staff, Phil Oldenburg's needs for information in conjunction with our "Coordination in Complex Settings" Study include the following:

- Some sense of Intelligence Community estimates of the net gains and losses to the United States of the expansion of the Diego Garcia tase, with reference to (a) countering Soviet naval growth; (b) relations with South Asia; (c) the ability to intervene, if necessary, in the Persian Gulf Region.
- After-the-fact evaluations of the effect of United 2. States' arms transfers to South Asia (particularly those in 1969 and 1970) in terms of (a) the impact on the stability of the region; (b) the growth or decline of United States influence on the governments of India and/or Pakistan.
- To the extent possible, a sense of what was known by 3. the Intelligence Community and what information was sent to whom among the policy makers on the prospects of the Mukti Bahini during 1971. A special point of interest was whether the strength of the Mukti Bahini was seen as making an early solution desirable.
- In general terms, estimates existing during 1971 about 4. the intentions of senior level Pakistani military officers, and who received how much of this information.
- Confirmation or correction of the asserted existence of 5. a CIA estimate in April, 1971 suggesting that a likely outcome of the tensions between East and West Pakistan would be the break-up of Pakistan. This would be important as a means of assessing whether policy makers were in possession of the best available information.



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On another subject, let me confirm to you that Professor Alexander George holds a current SECRET clearance in conjunction with his status as a RAND Corporation consultant. As the proposal for his project which you already have indicates, Professor George's interests on behalf of the Commission are in the general area of impediments to rational decision making, whether they arise from psychological or physiological stress, imperfect information, effects of small group decision making or related factors. Thus, Professor George would be interested in consulting with Intelligence Community experts who have devoted attention to such topics. He would not be looking at specific policies or decisions, nor to specific examples of individual or government performance.

Let me emphasize again my conviction that officers of the Intelligence Community are in a position to be of great assistance to the Commission and the importance of their contributions if we are to meet our own responsibilities.

Thank you very much for your assistance and should any questions arise concerning the Oldenburg or George request, please contact Bill Bacchus at 254-9850.

Sincerely,

Fisher Howe

Deputy Executive Director